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ABSTRACT 
The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional 
fights on policy proposals and outcomes.  This paper develops a theory of how legislators 
balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes.   It 
shows why a) senior members and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a 
committee’s jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal point in 
order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with 
jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars.   We empirically investigate these results 
examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress. 
I would like to thank David King, Romain Wacziarg, and seminar participants at Stanford, MIT and the Berkeley 
Franco-American Conference on the History, Economics and Law of Intellectual Property Protection for helpful 
comments.  Daniel Braga and Karen Freeman provided excellent for research assistance.   
Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes
May 24, 2011
1.  INTRODUCTION
Congressional committees, as gatekeepers of policy, have enormous power to determine 
the shape of proposed legislation that reaches the House floor.  Scholars have elucidated many 
reasons why the full membership of Congress might delegate its power to constituent 
committees.  These include that committees offer advantages in cost-effectively obtaining and 
disseminating information (Krehbiel 1992; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989), in avoiding cycling in 
voting and promoting compromise and log-rolling through the politically efficient distribution of 
rents to constituencies (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krutz 2001), and encouraging legislators to 
engage in long-term reputation building to create better information for voters (Kroszner and 
Strattman 2000).  All of these models, however, have an underlying assumption:  all 
jurisdictional boundaries for committees are static and clearly defined for all issues.  There is no 
ambiguity as to the single committee that exercises agenda-setting power over any given bill.
In practice, however, committee jurisdictional boundaries are fluid and ambiguous 
(Baumgartner et al. 2000).  In order to expand their powers, committees attempt to expand 
jurisdiction to issues on the periphery of other committees’ jurisdiction (King 1997).   In 
addition, new issues and technologies come about where no committee is clearly responsible 
(e.g. nuclear power, computing, Internet) (Oleszek 2001).  The contribution of this paper to is to 
demonstrate that while static boundaries convey monopoly agenda-setting power to the 
controlling committee that may lead to extreme policy, jurisdictional fights between committees 
lead not only to strategic behavior by committee members with respect to constituency interests, 
but can often lead to more moderate policy. 
2This paper examines how jurisdictional conflict between U.S. House committees affects 
policy proposals and policy outcomes.  By considering legislators and committees as foresightful 
and strategic, the paper explores the congressional actors who have incentive to challenge 
jurisdiction, and how these potential challenges affect the policy positions of the two committees 
engaged in a jurisdictional turf war.  While several previous papers in the area have adroitly 
described the phenomenon of jurisdictional conflict (Adler and Still 2000; King 1994; Hardin 
1998; Oleszek 2001, 2004) they have not linked the process of jurisdictional challenge to its 
effect on policy outcomes.  A small number of other papers have recognized that jurisdiction 
may affect policy outcomes, but these works have described only the broad contours of this 
phenomenon (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Bimber 1996; King 1997) and only tangentially 
consider its effects. If jurisdictional turf wars result in no differences in policy outcomes than 
those instances of no jurisdictional conflict, then they are of muted interest as a topic for 
scholarly study.  If jurisdictional turf wars result in large swings in policy outcomes than would 
otherwise happen, then the literature is quite sparse relative to its policy importance.  
The paper begins by developing a theory on jurisdiction with forward-looking 
committees and legislators.  From this theory, hypotheses are generated related to the incentives 
to introduce new bills and to explain eventual policy proposals and outcomes.  We predict the
conditions under which compromise will be likely and the nature of this compromise.  The paper 
then examines the theory with multiple pieces of evidence and statistical analyses from proposed 
legislation offering copyright protection to databases (also now known as Internet intellectual 
property legislation).  In 1999, the House of Representatives encountered a well-known instance
of jurisdictional uncertainty and encroachment on that intellectual property issue with the 
introduction of H.R. 353 and H.R. 1858 covering database copyright protection (Baron 2000;
3Oleszek 2004).  With many interest groups acting on each side of the issue, and legislators 
balancing jurisdictional issues against policy outcomes, the fight between the two bills typifies 
how jurisdictional battles evolve in Congress.  
This paper predicts theoretically, and demonstrates empirically, a number of interesting 
patterns in the behavior of legislators.  First, it shows how committees and legislators balance the 
benefits from policy outcomes with the benefits and costs associated with challenging 
jurisdiction over a policy domain.  Seeking jurisdiction is not a cost-free exercise, and legislators 
may be willing to accept a sub-optimal policy in order to obtain future jurisdiction over another
agenda.  This is not considered in other theories of committee power.  Second, the paper argues 
that those with the greatest incentive to challenge an incumbent jurisdiction will be senior 
members, and young members who are in safe districts for whom jurisdiction, and the political 
rents that come with it, is most valuable.  Statistical analyses are consistent with this prediction.  
These results stand in contrast to the current empirical literature, which generally assumes 
closed-rule, monopoly committee jurisdictions.  Finally, policy proposals and outcomes can be 
significantly affected by the possibility of a challenging committee arising.  In particular, the 
mere threat of introducing a challenger bill can serve to moderate the incumbent’s proposal.  
This is important because it suggests that in many areas, policy outcomes may be the result of an 
equilibrium strategy that the incumbent committee plays in order to fend off potential challenger 
committees.  Thus, introducing jurisdictional conflict frequently serves to create more moderate 
policy positions than would occur in a model of monopoly, agenda-setting committee power.  
Introducing multiple pieces of empirical evidence, we show how this occurs.
In the next section, we offer some background on House committee jurisdictions and 
develop a simple theoretical perspective that explicates the behavior when two competing bills 
4are introduced.  Section 3 summarizes the legislative fights over Internet database protection that 
occurred in the 106th Congress. Section 4 examines each of the hypotheses using both 
descriptive and statistical evidence.  Section 5 concludes.
2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1.  INSTITUTIONAL DETAIL: THE BILL REFERRAL PROCESS
The process of bill introduction is extremely detailed and complex. In this section, we 
provide an overview of how bills are referred to committees.  Potential legislation in the House is 
proposed by representatives in the form of bills.  Bills are introduced onto the House floor, and 
then forwarded to the House Parliamentarian, who refers the bill to a House committee for 
review, modification, or termination.  The House Parliamentarian is an appointee of the Speaker 
of the House and generally considered an unbiased referrer of bills (King 1997), referring bills 
probabilistically on the merits to individual committees.1
The bill referral process comprises two parts:  a codified component and a discretionary 
component.  Rule X of the House Rules allots jurisdiction covering pre-specified topics to 
certain committees.  For example, the Judiciary Committee has formal jurisdiction over “patents, 
the Patent and Trademark Office, copyrights, and trademarks,” and the Commerce Committee 
has formal jurisdiction over “consumer affairs and consumer protection, interstate and foreign 
commerce generally.”  Bills that fit neatly into the subject areas identified by Rule X are 
allocated by the Parliamentarian to the committees with codified jurisdiction over the issue.
Many bills, however, may not fit cleanly into the subject areas identified in Rule X.  
Some topics may be at the fringe of the jurisdiction of one committee, other bills may not fit into 
any jurisdiction.  Figure 1 illustrates this with a Venn diagram.  Imagine two committees, 1 and 
52, which have jurisdiction over some subset of issue areas.  The span of issues is represented by 
the box.  There are some issues for which there is no committee jurisdiction.  This is found in the 
area between the circles.  There are other issues such as A that are at the fringe of one 
committee’s jurisdiction (such as Internet intellectual property protection).  This paper is about 
bills like A. It is in these cases that the Parliamentarian may exercise discretion in bill referral.
When there is jurisdictional ambiguity, the Parliamentarian, as surrogate for the Speaker 
of the House, turns to other factors in determining the recipient committee (King 1997; Oleszek 
2004).  The first factor is whether the current bill amends a public law over which a committee 
already has jurisdiction.  The second factor is previous bill referral precedents, in a common law 
sense, as guidance for the current bill.  The third factor is committee expertise in the policy area, 
evidenced by oversight hearings (Talbert et al. 1995), the strategic selection of committee 
staffers, and joining of special issue caucuses.  The fourth factor is bill titles and preambles and 
matching these subject indicators to committees.  The Parliamentarian takes all these factors into 
account when deciding where the “weight of the bill” resides, and which committee should 
receive the bill.  For these reasons legislators adjust their behavior and the language in their bills, 
to enhance the probability that a bill will be referred to a particular committee.  
2.2.  THEORY
We begin by considering the preferences of legislators and committees.  A formal model 
is outlined in an electronic appendix.2 We make four simplifying assumptions.  First, all 
legislators of a given committee prefer more jurisdiction to less jurisdiction for that committee.3
Second, jurisdiction is zero-sum.  One committee’s gain in jurisdiction is another committee’s 
loss.  Third, the members of a committee may have differing incentives to introduce a bill.  That 
6is, bill introduction is not random, but there is a predictable process (with noise) that gives rise to 
them.4 Finally, the goal of a given legislator is to be re-elected.
With these four assumptions in hand, we can now analyze bill introduction.  We begin by 
considering only two committees and single-committee referral.  In the next section, we will 
examine multiple referrals. Any bill proposed by a legislator has three components of benefit that 
help the legislator to be reelected and help the committee members gain power.  The first 
component is the benefit of the policy outcome.  The second benefit is from legislative 
jurisdiction.  The third is the benefit from oversight jurisdiction.  However, policy creation is not 
free; it comes at a cost to the legislator.  We consider each of these factors below.  
The first benefit, policy outcomes, has been well-modeled in spatial location models 
(Snyder 1991, for example).  In these models, legislators choose policies that are on or close to 
the ideal points of the median voter in their constituency.  The closer the policy outcome is to the 
ideal policy of the median voter in their constituencies, the more utility the legislator obtains.
The second benefit is from legislative jurisdiction.  Legislative jurisdiction is the right of 
committee members to create, review, modify, and refer legislation on a given issue to the floor 
of the House.  There are multiple benefits supplied by legislative jurisdiction.  First, with 
legislative jurisdiction, committees can craft legislation close to their own likings, thus obtaining 
policy benefits.  Second, committee members have control over bills they can exploit in 
logrolling with other committees.  Third, committee members can extract informational and 
financial rents from the constituencies they regulate (Kroszner and Strattman 2000).  The benefit 
to the committee members is assumed to be increasing at a decreasing rate in jurisdiction.
A final type of benefit is oversight jurisdiction.  Enacted laws are normally delegated to a 
surrogate for implementation and interpretation.  For example, telecommunications policy is 
7frequently delegated to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  Intellectual property 
rules are sometimes delegated to the US Patent Office (USPTO), or are sometimes left in the 
hands of the the federal courts.  With each policy that is delegated, there normally is a
congressional committee that provides oversight of the agency charged with implementation.  
So, for example, the Commerce Committee oversees the FCC and the Judiciary Committee 
oversees the federal courts.  In most cases, legislative jurisdiction is coupled with oversight 
responsibilities, but this does not necessarily have to be the case.5 To the extent that the agency 
can promulgate regulations affecting industry and interest groups, congressional committees with 
oversight can place pressure (hearings, budgetary) on agencies to administratively to create 
policy that might have been difficult to implement within the legislative branch.  
All of these benefits are not cost-free to the committee members.  In order to engage in 
policy-making, jurisdiction, and oversight matters, members must invest time and effort, which 
is related to how much expertise the legislator has in the policy area and her facility in crafting 
legislation (Hall and Wayman 1990).  There is heterogeneity in costs across committees, as well 
as within committees.6
Thus, we can summarize the calculation made by an individual legislator.  She values 
(and can trade-off through a rational cost-benefit calculation) policy outcomes that are close to 
her ideal point, as well as (against) legislative and oversight jurisdiction over issues.  These 
benefits come at a cost of exerting effort in bill creation and introduction.  A re-election 
maximizing legislator then weighs these benefits and costs and finds her own optimal bill 
introduction behavior.
With the behavior of legislators characterized, let us take a policy issue in the position A
in Figure 1.  This is an issue over which an incumbent committee would normally have 
8jurisdiction.  We assume a) that the incumbent committee already has a bill under consideration 
(this is not a necessary condition, but makes exposition easier), and b) that all bills referred to the 
incumbent committee end up at the ideal policy point of the members (characterized by the 
median voter of that committee) in the absence of a competing bill.  
Now a potential challenger bill arises from a member of another committee.  If the 
challenger does introduce a bill, there is a probability, p, that this bill will be referred by the 
Parliamentarian to the challenger committee, and a probability (1-p) that it will be referred to the 
incumbent committee.  If the bill is referred to the incumbent committee, the bill is assumed to 
die.  To examine the effect of jurisdictional conflicts on policy outcomes, we consider two 
baseline cases. The first is an open rule, unidimensional median-voter model, where one 
committee has monopoly agenda-setting power to unilaterally send bills to the floor, but any 
member on the floor can propose amendments at zero (or very low) costs.  In this model, the 
equilibrium policy is determined by the median floor voter. This is because for any proposal that 
is not at median voter’s ideal point, there is another policy that can be introduced which the 
median prefers.  This makes any proposal that is not on the median voter’s ideal point unstable.
Let us consider a second baseline model common in the literature -- a closed-rule, 
unidimensional median-voter model with monopoly agenda-setting power for the incumbent 
committee.  This is equivalent in theory to the probability of a second bill being referred to the 
challenger committee being zero (p = 0).  This is similar to the previous case, except the policy 
proposed by the incumbent committee cannot be amended.  Thus, the median floor voter’s 
decision involves comparing the status quo, x, with the bill proposed by the committee, y.  As 
long as y is closer to the median voter’s ideal point than x, y will be an equilibrium.
9Within this second baseline model, let us examine a serious jurisdictional challenge:  a  
challenger committee receives the second bill with p = 0.3. All parties know that a member of 
this challenger committee can credibly threaten to introduce a competing bill, because by 
introducing that bill, the challenger’s committee gains some legislative jurisdiction over the issue 
and the incumbent committee loses some legislative jurisdiction over the issue (even if the bill 
does not pass).  This, in turn, enhances the bargaining position of the member of the challenger 
committee.  To prevent this loss of jurisdictional claims, the incumbent committee members will 
move the position of their bill (through mark-up, for example) closer to the challenger’s 
preferences so as to create little incentive for a challenger bill to arise in the first place.  This 
“compromise” solution will be a position such that the member of the challenger committee is no 
worse off under the bill he or she would have introduced initially plus the expected jurisdictional 
gains the challenger would make (minus the costs of bill introduction).  
What becomes evident is that as p increases, the incumbent committee is willing to 
introduce a bill closer to the challenger’s ideal point.  That is, as the threat of a challenger 
committee member encroaching on the policy space increases, the more the incumbent 
committee members are willing to attenuate their initial policy position to prevent this 
encroachment.  Thus, members are willing to modify policy for jurisdiction.  This is a form of 
compromise—offering a more moderate policy position to induce no jurisdictional challenge 
from a potential competitor.  This leads to the first hypothesis.
ATTENTUATION HYPOTHESIS
H1:  The greater the probability a challenger bill will be referred to another committee, the more 
moderate the incumbent committee’s policy position will be to prevent jurisdictional 
encroachment.
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As the theory notes, legislators can engage in trade-offs.  There are two prototypical types 
of models of legislators’ utility functions.  The first is a spatial model in policy space, where 
legislators seek to achieve their highest utility policy outcome.  The second is a jurisdictional 
encroachment model, where legislators are trying to obtain the most legislative and oversight 
jurisdiction feasible.  In this paper, legislators will maximize utility over both variables jointly.  
We can, moreover, predict those legislators who, within a challenger committee, will 
have the greatest incentive to act.  Jurisdiction has two properties.  First, as Hall (1998) notes, 
committee leadership positions play a leading role in jurisdictional grabs.  That is, senior 
members of the challenging committee (those who are subcommittee chairs and ranking minority 
members) attempt to expand their current power through these jurisdictional games.  In this 
view, bills that are likely to expand a committee’s jurisdiction are sponsored by these high-
ranking members.  An alternative view, supported by King (1997), is that legislative jurisdiction 
takes time to build, over multiple bill referrals in many congresses.  Oversight jurisdiction takes 
time to implement as well (Weingast and Moran 1983).  If jurisdiction is a mechanism to
produce “revenues” over the long-term, then people who expect to receive that income stream 
for the longest time should assign the highest value to engaging in jurisdictional grabs.  This 
would suggest that junior members of the challenging committee in safe seats (who can expect to 
be around for a long time) will have the greatest incentive to engage in jurisdictional challenges.  
These considerations are not taken into account in the previous theories of bill sponsorship.  This 
leads to Hypothesis 2.
JURISDICTION HYPOTHESES
H2a:  If legislative and oversight jurisdiction is valued highly enough by members of the 
challenger committee, the members of the challenger committee will introduce policies that are 
not close to its ideal point so as to gain jurisdiction. 
H2b:  Senior members in the challenger committee are most likely to sponsor challenger bills.
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H2c:  Young members in safe seats on the challenger committee are most likely to sponsor 
challenger bills.  
2.3.  THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS
One of the recent characteristics of the bill referral process is the use of multiple referral.  
As Oleszek (2004) describes in detail, there have been at various times over the past 35 years 
three main mechanisms that a Speaker or Parliamentarian can use to refer a bill to multiple 
committees:  joint referral (referral to multiple committees simultaneously), sequential referral 
(referral to multiple committees sequentially), and split referral (referral of different parts of the 
bill to different committees simultaneously).  Oleszek argues that the Parliamentarian can 
minimize hard fought turf wars by exploiting the multiple referral process.  
This theory also suggests that multiple referrals might mitigate, but should not negate, the 
inter-jurisdictional fights.  Although the theory is most cleanly applied to the case of a single 
referral, one of the assumptions of the theory is that even if an incumbent committee is forced to 
share jurisdiction with a one other or with multiple challenger committees, there is a loss of 
monopoly power (and the benefits it conveys) to the incumbent committee.  The theory predicts 
that to prevent this, the focal committee will change its proposed policy position, away from its 
most-preferred policy position, even in a multiple referral situation.  Compared to single 
referrals, multiple referrals may temper turf wars somewhat because the incumbent committee 
retains some jurisdictional claim, but the theory would also predict that the potential loss of 
monopoly jurisdiction by the incumbent committee will still cause some policy attenuation.  
A second concern articulated that may limit the scope of the theory is an unfavorable 
policy outcome for the Speaker after moderating the incumbent committee’s policy stance.  If in 
averting turf wars between committees, the incumbent committee shifts its position to a policy 
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that is further away from the Speaker’s ideal point than the non-attenuated position, it would be 
in the Speaker’s interest to bypass the Parliamentarian and refer the bill directly to the incumbent 
committee.  The mere knowledge that a Speaker may do this could affect p and thus mitigate the 
attenuation hypothesis.  
A number of factors should minimize this concern.  First, King (1997) suggests that the
Speaker has delegated authority consciously in the referral process to the Parliamentarian in 
order to keep politics and policy out of this aspect.  (See footnote 1 for a further explication of 
this argument.)  He cites, as just one example, the fact that Parliamentarians span multiple 
speakers, have decades of training, and are truly thought of as being unbiased.  Second, to the 
extent Speakers are themselves involved in the bill referral process separate from the 
Parliamentarian’s role,7 it is the case that many issues are not so partisan so as to create divisions 
with the majority party’s leadership.  However, the theory need not be limited to non-partisan 
issues.  Indeed, third, frequently the Speaker may not have good information with respect to his 
preferred policy outcome or the degree of moderation that might occur during a committee’s 
deliberations.  For example, bills are becoming more complex and their full policy implications
less certain because of new problem areas, such as homeland security, advancing technologies, 
and changing economic situations (Oleszek 2004: 86).  Alternatively, as the position of bills 
reach the fringe position, A, it may be difficult for the Speaker to anticipate jurisdictional 
challenges.  
Overall, the theory generates two general predictions.  First, legislators will trade off the 
costs and benefits of obtaining additional jurisdictional scope for the committee with their own 
policy preferences.  Second, legislators will act in predictable ways based on their positions on
the committees and their electoral vulnerabilities.  In the next section, we examine these 
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hypotheses with reference to Internet intellectual property bills.
3. BACKGROUND:  INTERNET DATABASE PROTECTION
In January 1999, Howard Coble (R-NC) introduced (for a second time), a bill (H.R. 353) 
to strengthen Internet intellectual property protection (Baron 2000).  A group of companies and 
interest groups, led by eBay, the Realtors Association, and Reed Elsevier, had been pressing 
Congress to act.  The rise of the Internet made it particularly easy for pirates to extract and copy 
on-line, electronic, and Internet databases.  Indeed, many of these companies had become subject 
to “attack” from “pirates.”  
For example, Bidder’s Edge, a rival to eBay, had built its business model on auction 
aggregation.  The company designed algorithms to search across 120 online auction sites, and 
then download information from these sites into its own database to be displayed on its own site.  
The “spiders” copied and downloaded about 80,000 web pages from eBay onto the Bidder’s 
Edge site daily; eBay estimated that Bidder’s Edge alone accounted for between 1% and 1.5% 
of the queries received by eBay.  This imposed a heavy load on eBay’s servers and made its 
computers operate slower for customers accessing the site directly.
These “attacker” companies sought legal protection under a 1991 U.S Supreme Court 
decision known popularly as the “Feist” (Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service 
Company, 499 US 340).  The key question before the Supreme Court involved the scope of 
copyright protection.  What information in databases could be protected?  The Feist Court ruled, 
“…all facts-scientific, historical, biographical and news of the day . . . are part of the public 
domain available to every person.”  They continued:
“The facts contained in existing works may be freely copied because copyright protects only the elements 
that owe their origin to the compiler -- the selection, coordination, and arrangement of facts.”
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Given that Bidder’s Edge was using publicly available facts about auctions, Bidder’s 
Edge argued it stood to reason, in light of the Feist decision, that the facts in the online databases 
were not protected by copyright, and thus could be copied, provided that their selection, 
coordination, and arrangement were not.
Against this backdrop, database companies such as Monster.com, NASDAQ, and the 
NYSE, sought a re-write of the copyright law, and turned to the chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Howard Coble.  eBay, the 
Realtors, and the publishers prevailed upon Rep. Coble introduced a bill to strengthen the 
copyright protection afforded to electronic and online databases.  In January 1999, Rep. Coble 
introduced a bill to increase intellectual property protection for electronic databases.  
The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (H.R. 353) introduced by Coble, did not 
grant copyright protection to facts per se, but it did seek to protect databases and thus overturn 
Feist.  Amending the Sherman Antitrust Act, H.R. 353 made it illegal for any person to:
“make available to others, or extract to make available to others, all or a substantial part of a collection of 
information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the investment of substantial monetary or 
other resources, so as to cause material harm to the primary market or a related market of that other person, …for a 
product or service that incorporates that collection of information and is offered or intended to be offered in 
commerce by that other person….”
Any person who was harmed under the terms of the H.R. 353 could bring a civil court case 
against the alleged infringer, and ask for the recovery of lost profits, treble damages under the 
Sherman Act’s penalty provisions, and payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees.  The Act was well 
received by database producers.  As head of the Intellectual Property Subcommittee that had 
traditionally overseen copyright legislation, Coble was well-positioned to shepherd his bill 
through the 106th House of Representatives to a final, and expected winning vote on the 
Republican-majority floor.
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H.R. 353, however, resulted in the organization of a competing coalition of interest 
groups comprising old and new economy firms and associations that opposed the bill, 
spearheaded by Yahoo!, NetCoalition (a consortium of ten large Internet companies, including 
AOL and Amazon), Bloomberg, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Research 
Libraries Association. These database users were concerned about how a strengthening of
copyright protection might affect their business models.  A large number of universities, 
including Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford, (and their associated research libraries) argued if 
database companies were able to compile and copyright the facts from their databases, scientific 
research of all types would be constrained significantly and might even be slowed to a snail’s 
pace.  Smaller universities, too, articulated concerns that if H.R. 353 became law it would 
hamstring their teaching missions because materials and databases used for teaching purposes 
would no longer be accessible.
In May 1999, as H.R. 353 was working its way through the Judiciary Committee, this 
coalition persuaded Thomas Bliley (R-VA), chairman of the Commerce Committee, to introduce 
a competing bill that had the effect of codifying into proposed legislation the Feist decision with 
some small additional protections.  This bill, the Consumer and Investor Access to Information 
Act of 1999 (H.R. 1858), was referred to the Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection.  H.R. 1858 made it:
“… unlawful for any person or entity…to sell or distribute to the public a database that--
          (1) is a duplicate of another database that was collected and organized by another person or entity; and
          (2) is sold or distributed in commerce in competition with that other database”
Enforcement of the Act rested with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and violators 
of the Act were punished under the rules respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices under 
section 5 of the enabling legislation, a much more lenient punishment than H. R. 353 prescribed.  
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Under Rule X, the House Commerce Committee is granted jurisdiction over the Federal Trade 
Commission.  There were now two competing bills in Congress in two committees.  
In Figure 2, we outline in a one-dimensional spatial diagram, the positions of the players.  
Feist (F) was a lenient outcome, offering very low protection to databases.  The Judiciary 
Committee introduced a bill with very strong protections, which it manifested in the introduction 
of the H.R. 353 (C).  We place C opposite F, but closer to the median voter, M, than to F, the 
median voter.  Thus, an unopposed Coble bill would likely become law because it captures the 
median voter. Finally, the Commerce Committee introduced H.R. 1858 (B), such that it was on 
the interval [F, C].  We place it to the right of Feist, and closer to the median voter than C.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we examine empirically the predictions of the committee jurisdiction 
model on legislator behavior, committee behavior, and policy outcomes.  We explore the two 
theoretical hypotheses by examining the copyright dispute between the two committees.  While 
none of the evidence presented provides unequivocal proof of the theory, the goal of this section 
is to provide multiple pieces of evidence that together will build a sufficiently convincing story 
that the theoretical mechanisms discussed in Part III actually are operating.
4.1 ATTENTUATION HYPOTHESIS
In examining the evidence for Hypothesis 1, we establish two main facts: the Judiciary 
Committee was the incumbent committee, and the probability of a challenger committee arising 
was so small that the Judiciary Committee did not attenuate its extreme position.  If the 
probability had been high, then, in equilibrium, the Judiciary Committee should have introduced
a moderate bill, close to the preferences of the competing committee, to stave off a jurisdictional 
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challenge.  If the probability was low that a challenger committee would become involved, then 
the bill introduced by the Judiciary Committee could more closely reflect the preferences of the 
committee, and thus be more extreme.  
There are three main factors suggesting that the Judiciary Committee was the incumbent 
committee, and that it was likely to receive H.R. 353.  First, Representative Coble had a long-
standing interest in the bill.  This was not the first time a nearly identical version of this same bill 
had gone through the House.  The earlier bill was also referred to the Judiciary Committee in the 
105th Congress, giving precedent for the more recent bill to follow the same committee referral 
path.  Second, Coble’s staff, with the help of like-minded interest groups, had written H.R. 353.  
King (1997) notes that bills contained language so as to route the bill to certain committees.  For 
example, H.R. 353 extended the Sherman Act, a law that was under Rule X’s jurisdiction of the 
Judiciary Committee.  Finally, the Judiciary Committee had a long-established precedent for  
handling bills covering copyright.  Table 1 examines all legislative hearings covering proposed 
copyright bills in the 80th through 103rd congresses (1946-1994).  The data include every 
congressional hearing reported by the Congressional Information Research Service over that 
period.  Each hearing is categorized further into 222 topics (of which copyright is one); we 
further limit our analysis to legislative hearings.8 During this nearly 50-year period, the 
Judiciary Committee received 86% (127) of copyright referrals.  (We compare this to very stable 
issues areas, such as agriculture, which exhibits an 86% to 90% probability of bill referral to the 
Agriculture Committee.)  We assume that this was the lowest probability that the Coble bill 
would have been referred to the Judiciary committee.    
The second fact we try to establish is the degree of and reasons for attenuation.  If the 
somewhat extreme position of H.R. 353 is to be an equilibrium policy choice for the Judiciary 
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Committee, then we must assess the probability (p) that a challenger bill would be referred to a 
second committee for consideration.  If p is high, then Coble should have introduced a bill that 
was moderate; if p is low the bill can mirror the Judiciary Committee’s preferences in 
equilibrium.9 As noted in Table 1, 14% of legislative hearings on copyright bills were sent to 
another committee.  Thus, there was an unconditional probability of 14% that another committee 
might get a second bill.  The Science, Space and Technology Committee (under various names) 
received the second most number of copyright bill referrals at 5% (8) during 1946-1994, and 
posed perhaps the greatest threat for producing a competing bill.  However, Representative 
James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis), Chairman of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, 
was in line to ascend to the chair of the Judiciary Committee, and did not want to undermine the 
possibility of this coming to fruition in the next congress.  He was thus reticent to introduce a bill 
competing with the Judiciary Committee’s bill.  With the Science Committee unlikely to 
introduce a bill, the base probability that Coble faced was about p = 9% that another committee 
would introduce and receive a competing bill. 10 Thus, the behavior of the Judiciary Committee 
in introducing a somewhat extreme proposal is reasonable and therefore consistent with the 
Attenuation Hypotheses.  
A final fact we attempt to establish is that the Representative Coble’s staff did not expect 
a jurisdictional challenge to H.R. 353, and therefore introduced a bill that reflected the 
preferences of the committee without attenuation.  As part of this study, we conducted interviews 
with 15 lobbyists who represented various interest groups on both sides of H.R. 353 and H.R. 
1858.  One lobbyist who helped to write and spearhead H.R. 353 noted: 
“We were a bit surprised by the extent of opposition to H.R. 353.  Representative Coble has strong 
views on the need to protect databases and he understood our position.  He had introduced a very 
similar bill in the last Congress.  When we worked with Representative Coble’s staff, we 
discussed the possibility of another bill being introduced—possibly by another committee—and 
we dismissed that idea….  Would we have recommended a bill with lower penalties if we had 
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known the opposition were [sic] going to introduce H.R. 1858?  Possibly—it would have been a 
bill with fewer penalties and possibly more exemptions—but it is hard to know because we …
never really discussed it. ” 
Later he said:
“We wrote [H.R. 353] to amend the [Sherman Antitrust Act] so that we [the Judiciary Committee] 
would get the bill.  They [the H.R. 1858 coalition] were pretty clever to use the FTC [Federal 
Trade Commission] [in H.R. 1858] to try to sap support for our bill.”
Another lobbyist, representing an interest group that opposed H.R. 353, said, 
“We tried to negotiate with them [H.R. 353 supporters], but they wouldn’t budge.  We explained 
how this could potentially destroy our businesses—really hurt the development of the Internet.  
They still wouldn’t budge.  I think they were surprised when found a way to introduce H.R. 1858 
[around the Judiciary Committee and] into the Commerce Committee.”
The views of the lobbyists interviewed on both sides of the issue during the jurisdictional fight 
(to extent that they are reflective of congressional opinion) provide additional evidence that 
jurisdiction and policy attenuation issues were contemplated by legislative staffs.  Moreover, we 
find additional evidence for this hypothesis in the next section’s statistical analysis.
4.2.  JURISDICTION HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 2a predicts that challenger committee members may not support bills in their 
best policy interest if they believe that such a position will expand the scope of the committee’s 
legislative and oversight jurisdictional responsibilities.  While the theory in Section 2 does not 
exclude the possibility that bills will be introduced by challengers with policy positions they 
support, there are few theories that predict that bills that are not in the policy interests of 
legislators will be introduced.  
To test this hypothesis, we examine bill co-sponsorship and its relationship to turf wars 
using multivariate statistical analysis focusing on the policy-jurisdiction trade-off.  As noted in 
Section 3, oversight of the implementation of database copyright bills was to be delegated to the 
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courts in H.R. 353 and to the FTC in H.R. 1858.   Hence, Coble and Bliley delegated 
implementation of their respective bills to surrogates for which they had proximate control.
If Hypothesis 2a is credible, we should see the sponsors of H.R. 353 supporting their 
constituents’ preferences.  H.R. 353’s sponsors believe ex ante that the likelihood for a challenge 
to the Coble-sponsored bill was low; thus, to them, the jurisdictional benefits were moot.
Supporters of H.R. 1858 could be responsive to their constituents, or to jurisdictional issues.  If 
we find the constituency responsiveness, this is consistent with a host of different theories.  
However, if we do not find evidence of constituency responsiveness, but do find jurisdictional 
responsiveness, the results will be consistent with a theory of jurisdictional conflict. 
We begin by considering as our dependent variable whether a legislator co-sponsored 
H.R. 353 (1) or not (0).  In a second set of specifications, we consider whether a legislator co-
sponsored H.R. 1858 (1) or not (0).  We consider four types of independent variables.  The first 
variable, EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT (from the Bureau of the Census), measures the 
amount of educational employment (in thousands) in a legislator’s district.  Given that within 
congressional districts, the number of school-age children does not differ greatly, any differences 
in educational employment across districts is usually due to the presence of one or more 
universities in the district. Recall that only universities were a cleanly identifiable industry sector 
that was uniformly opposed to H.R. 353, and supported H.R. 1858.  Over 100 individual 
universities and nearly all university trade groups representing community colleges through 
Carnegie I research universities, publicly expressed opposition to H.R. 353 and support for H.R. 
1858.  Thus educational employment should be correlated with constituent preferences.11
The second set of variables identifies the committee assignments of the legislators, to 
control for jurisdictional disputes.  Dummy variables for membership on the House 
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COMMERCE COMMITTEE, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, and SCIENCE COMMITTEE are 
coded from the Congressional Quarterly.  The third set of variables measures the ADA score of
the representative (provided by Professor Timothy Groseclose), as a proxy for the legislator’s 
ideology.  Finally, a number of control variables for the representative’s district are coded to 
control for constituent characteristics that might be related to outcomes of the bills.  These 
include MEDIAN INCOME (in thousands of dollars), MEDIAN HOME VALUE (in hundreds 
of thousands of dollars) (as a measure of wealth), and the number of individuals (in thousands) 
with college degrees (EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT). All of these latter variables are 
derived from the STF3 file of the 1990 U.S. Census of Housing and Population.12
The predictions of the theory with respect to Hypothesis 2a are threefold.  First, to the 
extent that the incumbent committee members believe they are acting in a setting where 
committee jurisdictions are unchallenged, the proposed bill proposed should reflect the true 
policy concerns of its sponsors’ constituents.  Therefore, we should find the coefficients on 
educational employment to be negative and statistically significant for the H.R. 353 regressions.  
Second, if the members of the challenging (Commerce) committee are seeking jurisdiction, and 
not actual policy outcomes, they should not be voting in ways consistent with their constituents’
preferences.  So the coefficients on educational employment for H.R. 1858 should not be 
statistically significant. Finally, jurisdictional conflict between committees should be manifested 
in committee memberships, with committee members splitting their votes to support their own 
bills.  Thus, in the H.R. 353 regression, there should be a positive coefficient on the Judiciary 
Committee variable and a negative coefficient on the Commerce Committee variable.  The 
opposite should be true of the H.R. 1858 regressions. All three of these predictions together are 
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consistent with the various predictions of Hypothesis 2a, and the latter two are inconsistent with 
theories of committee monopoly power.
I have estimated this model with a probit, logit, and rare events probit (King and Zeng 
2001) specifications, and all have nearly identical results. We present the results of a probit
analysis in Table 2.  In all statistical models in this paper, the coefficients report the change in 
the probability of the dependent variable for an infinitesimal change in each independent, 
continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.  
The two-sided t-statistics are presented below the coefficient estimates, with the 95%, and 99% 
significance level noted for each coefficient.   Models (1) and (2) use H.R. 353 as the dependent 
variable; Models (3) and (4) use H.R. 1858 as the dependent variable.  Models (1) and (3) 
contain only the constituency and ideology variables; Models (2) and (4) include the committee 
assignment variables.  H.R. 353 was cosponsored by 17% of the members of Congress; the 
sponsors of H.R. 1858 represented only about 4% of the House’s membership.
In Models (1) and (2) the coefficient on educational sector employment is negative and 
statistically significant as predicted.  In no specification is the coefficient on ADA score or any 
other control variables statistically significant.  Replacing ADA score with the party affiliation of 
the representative has no qualitative effect on the results.  The large negative coefficient on 
educational employment for Models (1) and (2) is consistent with H.R. 353’s co-sponsors voting 
with the preferences of the constituents.  Every 10,000-person (about 1.5%) increase in 
educational employment (roughly the employment of a large university in the district) makes a 
legislator 7.7% less likely to sponsor H.R. 353.  This is consistent with the first prediction and 
also provides further support for the Attenuation Hypothesis.  In Models (3) and (4), the 
coefficients on educational employment are not statistically different from zero.  This is 
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consistent with H.R. 1858 supporters not sincerely voting with their constituents’ interests,
which supports the second prediction.  
Finally, the four coefficients on the Judiciary and Commerce Committee membership 
variables are all large in magnitude, signed as predicted, and three of the four are statistically 
significant.  Science Committee members exhibit no discernible higher or lower co-sponsorship 
tendencies for the two bills than other members of the House.  A Commerce Committee member 
is 10.1% less likely to cosponsor H.R. 353 than the average House member, and 23.4% more 
likely to cosponsor H.R. 1858 than the average member.  A Judiciary Committee member is 
33.5% more likely to cosponsor H.R. 353 and 1.1% less likely to the cosponsor H.R. 1858 than 
the average House member.  This last coefficient on Judiciary Committee membership is 
negative as expected, but does not reach statistical significance.  Rep. Rick Boucher, who sits on 
both the Commerce and Judiciary Committees, was the only Judiciary Committee member to co-
sponsor the Bliley bill.  The small number of sponsors (18) likely drives the lack of statistical 
significance on this coefficient.  Other than this consideration, all coefficients come out as 
expected.  This last result on committee membership is consistent with the third prediction of 
jurisdictional battles between committees. 
Together, these three results suggest that turf wars are important, and that the incumbents, 
not expecting a challenge, acted more sincerely than the challengers did in the policy domain, 
consistent with Part 2a of the Jurisdictional Hypothesis.  
Hypotheses 2b and 2c further refine the predictions about bill introduction.  They predict 
that senior members overall and junior members in safe seats of the challenging committee will 
have the greatest incentive to exert effort in mounting a jurisdictional challenge.  The legislators 
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who gain the most from jurisdictional disputes are those who can take advantage of the 
committee’s current jurisdiction, and those who value the property right over the long term.  
To test this hypothesis, we conduct an econometric analysis of the co-sponsorship 
behavior of members of the challenging committee.  We consider the identities of the members 
of the Commerce Committee (n = 53) who co-sponsored H.R. 1858, the challenging bill, using 
as our dependent variable whether a member of the Commerce Committee cosponsored H.R. 
1858 (1) or not (0).  The independent variables are as before, but this time we include three 
additional variables.  The first is COMMITTEE RANK.  This is an ordinal measure of 
Commerce Committee seniority (obtained from the Congressional Quarterly) and ranges from 1 
(for the chairman or ranking member) to 29 (for the most junior members).  The second is 
ELECTION MARGIN.  It is a measure of how safe the member is in her seat (margin of victory 
in thousands of votes in the last election) (obtained from the Clerk of the House).  Finally we 
interact COMMITTEE RANK with ELECTION MARGIN.  We predict that the coefficient on 
COMMITTEE RANK should be negative (more senior members are more likely to support 
challenging bills) and the coefficient on the interaction variable of ELECTION 
MARGIN*COMMITTEE RANK should be positive (junior members with larger margins of 
victory in the last election are more likely to support challenging bills).
The results of the probit analysis are presented in Model (5) of Table 3.  Congruent with 
our earlier findings, legislator ideology, educational employment, and the control variables do 
not have statistically significant coefficients.13 There is, however, a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables of theoretical interest and the dependent variable.  Senior 
members of the Commerce Committee are more likely to sponsor H.R. 1858.  Each step up on 
the committee makes an individual 4.4% more likely to sponsor H.R. 1858.  Moreover, junior 
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legislators with large vote margins in the last election are more likely to support H.R. 1858 than 
are others.  These results provide evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of Hall (1998) 
(Hypothesis 2b) and King (1997) (Hypothesis 2c).14
These results can also be juxtaposed with those of Krehbiel’s (1995) examination of 
budget bills, which shows that electoral margins make no difference in bill co-sponsorship, while 
more junior members of committees are more likely to co-sponsor bills.  One key factor that 
differentiates Krehbiel’s work from this study is that there is no jurisdictional conflict in 
Krehbiel’s analysis of budget votes.  Indeed, it may be that precisely because there is 
jurisdictional conflict, the current paper refines the results of Krehbiel.  Junior members get little 
benefit from jurisdiction (in this paper), but may derive considerable benefit from high profile 
co-sponsorship on budgeting issues (in Krehbiel’s paper).  However, representing safe districts 
makes enormous difference to junior members in jurisdictional disputes, and can lead to more 
co-sponsorship.
4.3. LIMITATIONS
The current empirical work is not without limitations.  First, the setting provides only a 
weak test of the attenuation hypothesis.  This hypothesis predicts that legislators will attenuate 
policy outcomes close to their preferences to deter jurisdictional challenges.  In fact, the 
empirical evidence on the Judiciary Committee argues the inverse:  the Judiciary Committee did 
not expect a jurisdictional challenge so it did not attenuate policy.  Although this evidence is 
consistent with the attenuation hypothesis, a more robust test would allow the researcher to more 
concretely examine the attenuation hypothesis.15
Second, the results in Models 1-4 must be interpreted a bit carefully.  Although a chi-
square test of the coefficients on Educational Employment and Commerce Committee in Model 
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4 rejects that they are jointly equal to zero, the test for attenuation is again a weak one.  Models 3 
and 4 reject that legislators are more likely to sponsor H.R. 1858 if Educational Employment in 
the district is large.  This fact is consistent with the theory, but this is the null, and therefore a 
less than ideal test.16 For example, we cannot reject the conjecture that extreme policy results 
from interest group action.  A better test is certainly called for in future work.
Third, because the discussion here is a case study, its generalizability may be limited.  
Moreover, because the incumbent committee did not engage in attenuation (but, thought about it, 
according to the lobbyists), the paper maintains a somewhat weak test of the attenuation 
hypothesis.  We also recognize that while much of the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
it is not conclusive.  Rather, the paper has attempted to bring together multiple pieces of 
evidence to demonstrate that the attenuation hypothesis was in play.  We believe that the 
preponderance of the evidence regarding motivations and outcomes suggests that attenuation 
occurs. That said, a large sample study would seem to be warranted for future research.
5.  CONCLUSION
Jurisdictional conflict between committees within Congress is common and increasing 
(Baumgartner et al. 2000). The theoretical perspective developed in this paper extends a small 
but important body of literature examining congressional committee jurisdiction.  It demonstrates 
that actors with foresight can have large impacts on policy outcomes by merely threatening to 
engage in jurisdictional turf wars.  Moreover, legislators and committees will engage in 
jurisdictional turf wars even if that means introducing sub-optimal legislation from the sponsor’s 
viewpoint.  This is because the gains from obtaining a slice of legislative or oversight jurisdiction 
over an issue may result in a greater gain to utility than the loss of a particular policy position.  In 
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many cases, policy outcomes are predicted to be closer to the status quo than they would be in 
the unidimensional, closed rule, monopoly committee dominance literature.
The paper examines two Internet intellectual property protection bills before the 106th
Congress, to test implications of the theory.  The descriptive and statistical evidence illustrates 
how jurisdictional wars between committees play out.  The evidence is consistent with the main 
tenets of the paper.  This paper sheds new light on the committee jurisdiction literature.  It 
suggests that scholars examining the relationship between committee behavior and policy 
outcomes should be careful to consider the jurisdictional disputes that could potentially arise and 
how that might affect policy outcomes.  Without controlling for this effect, scholars may 
generate spurious results.  This analysis will help guide thinking about how these effects play 
out.
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ENDNOTES
1 As King (1997: 79-80) notes: “the House parliamentarians are described as neutral arbiters of 
jurisdictional disputes. Although these guardians are agents of the Speaker, who is an agent of the 
majority party, the Speaker abides by advice from the parliamentarians when turf wars arise. … Today, 
although the House rules say that the Speaker refers bills, the Speaker's referrals are overwhelmingly 
guided (and usually written) by the parliamentarian. Following the revolt against Cannon in 1910 (and the 
brief "King Caucus" period of the early 1910s), jurisdictional arbitration was largely taken out of partisan 
hands and given to the parliamentarian, who uses nonpartisan decision rules that reward jurisdictionally 
proximate committees.”  For a further discussion of this important assumption, see King (1997: 78-88) 
and Section IIC of this paper.
2 A formal model can be found at http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/defigueiredo
3 “Why fight over committee jurisdictions? These battles are about power, influence and property rights 
over public policies. From the Latin words juris and dictio, jurisdiction literally means the right or 
authority to make pronouncements that are binding and are backed up by law. ‘No characteristic of the 
committee system,’ writes the Congressional Research Service, ‘is more critical than its jurisdictional 
structure— the way in which it divides and distributes control over policy subjects.’” (King 1997: 11-12).  
In addition Oleszek (2004: 81) also quotes individual legislators identifying jurisdiction’s importance.  
4 This assumption is necessary for the scope of strategic bill introduction by legislators.
5 For example, antitrust enforcement of entertainment firms is left to the Department of Justice, though 
both Commerce and Judiciary Committees have legislative jurisdiction for antitrust.
6 If bill introduction is a cost-free exercise, then the expected net benefit to introducing a bill is strictly 
positive for all members of Congress for any p > 0.  However, the cost is not zero.  Members with 
experience, expertise, and interest in the focal policy issue or related policy issues will likely have lower 
costs of formulating policy in the focal area at hand.  That is, it is very expensive for an Agriculture 
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Committee member to write a bill regarding copyright, but it is less expensive for a Commerce 
Committee member.  
7 This may be true recently as the Republicans fired two Senate Parliamentarians in early 2000s as they 
referred key bills in a manner inconsistent with the Majority Leader’s wishes.
8 The data were obtained from the Center for American Politics and Public Policy web page at the 
University of Washington, http://depts.washington.edu/ampol/.
9 H.R. 353 likely reflected the sincere preferences of the Judiciary Committee.  To establish sincerity of 
the preferences, we turn to two main arguments.  First, the current bill was almost identical to the bill 
introduced into the previous Congress, when there was no jurisdictional challenge.  Second, H.R. 353 
reflected the consistent behavior and rhetoric of the Judiciary Committee in supporting strong protections 
for intellectual property rights.  Although the Coble bill had the support of the median voter ( as indicated 
by the voice vote in the previous Congress) it was stronger than the Feist decision.  
10 King has pointed out that in reality, the true probabilities are probably much lower than reflected in this 
paper, but highly correlated with the estimated probabilities.
11 We attempted to identify another measure of university presence.  Following de Figueiredo and 
Silverman (2006), we downloaded from the Department of Education, Division of Education Statistics,
the names and zip codes of every post-secondary institution in the United States in 1999 from the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.  We then examined all Carnegie-designated
institutions.  There are 434 districts with Carnegie designated institutions which makes it infeasible to use 
the presence of a university in a district as an alternative measure to Educational Employment.
12 The maximum correlation between any of these three control variables is 0.76.  The results presented 
herein are robust to dropping any one of these control variables. 
13 The lack of statistical significance on the Educational Employment coefficient is subject to the caveats 
in Section IV,C.
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14 A similar analysis done on Judiciary Committee H.R. 353 cosponsors finds that neither of these 
variables have a statistically significant effect. This is consistent with the theory, because only challenger 
committees stand to gain jurisdiction from these jurisdictional turf wars.
15 The statistical test of H.R. 1858 attempts to address this issue.
16 A second possible reason for this result is that there is more variance in Educational Employment for 
non-Bliley supporters than for Bliley supporters.  Although, the standard deviation is 25% higher, it is 
still less than 5% of the mean value of the variable, which is likely not quite large enough to single-
handedly drive the t-statistic on the Educational Employment coefficient down to such a low level in 
Model 4.
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H.R. 353 H.R. 353 H.R. 1858 H.R. 1858
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational Employment -0.0083**
(-2.11)
-0.0078**
(-1.99)
0.0004
(0.19)
0.0008
(0.54)
Commerce Committee -0.1014**
(-1.96)
0.2344***
(5.88)
Science Committee -0.0278
(-0.50)
0.0179
(0.71)
Judiciary Committee 0.3350***
(4.55)
-0.0112
(-0.49)
ADA -0.0003
(-0.58)
-0.0002
(-.44)
-0.00015
(-0.56)
-0.00003
(-0.21)
Median Home Value 0.0026
(0.07)
-0.0073
(-0.18)
0.0104
(0.48)
0.0018
(0.09)
Median Income 0.0003
(0.78)
0.0036
(0.94)
-0.0016
(-0.72)
-0.0012
(-0.85)
Educational Attainment .0016
(1.08)
0.0017
(1.17)
-0.0001
(-0.17)
-0.0002
(-0.29)
n 435 435 435 435
LL 11.50 37.39 1.45 38.70
Two-sided t-statistics below coefficient estimates
** 95% significance
*** 99% significance
TABLE 2:  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS FROM BILL COSPONSORSHIP
TABLE 3:  COMMERCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP COSPONSORS
H.R. 1858
Variable Model 5
Educational Employment -0.0026(-0.26)
ADA -0.0003
(-0.01)
Median Home Value -0.0109
(-0.02)
Median Income -0.0031
(-0.50)
Educational Attainment 0.0006
(0.22)
Committee Rank -0.0441**
(-2.57)
Election Margin -0.0019
(-0.89)
Committee Rank * Election 
Margin
0.0004**
(2.06)
n 53
LL -18.76
Two-sided t-statistics below coefficient estimates
** 95% significance
Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes
APPENDIX:  A SHORT FORMAL MODEL
We begin characterizing the general game, and then apply it to the expected equilibrium 
behavior of the H.R. 353 and 1858.   
There are two committees (J and T), and there are three legislators (P, Q, and R).  We 
note J as the “incumbent” committee, and T as the “challenging committee.”  P is a member of J
and fully embodies the preferences and policies of the J. P can be thought of as the median voter 
of J, or as the committee chair.  For simplicity, as we explicate the game, we drop the subscript 
of P and refer only to J or to the “incumbent” or “incumbent committee.”  Q and R are members 
of committee T.
The moves of the game are as follows.  First, the incumbent chooses a policy C, and 
simultaneously, the challenging committee determines whether Q or R will represent the 
challenger committee to potentially introduce a bill to compete with the incumbent’s policy (we 
call this chosen legislator the challenger).  Second, the challenger chooses whether or not to 
introduce a competing bill, B.  Third, nature moves and with probability p refers B to the 
challenger’s committee (and to the incumbent’s committee with probability 1-p).  Finally, the 
incumbent and challenger choose to dispense with the bills choosing either a floor fight, a 
compromise, or to kill both bills.   
We can characterize the utility functions for Q and R of the challenger committee as 
follows:
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1where jtU is the utility to legislator },{, RQjj  in period t,
*
tx is the equilibrium policy 
generated in period t, )(oF j is the benefit to oversight jurisdiction, o, )(lG j is the benefit to 
legislative jurisdiction, l,  is the discount rate, and )(eC j is the cost, C, of effort, e, legislator j
exerts in writing a bill.  We can re-index the legislator who is chosen to represent the challenger 
committee, in equilibrium, T.  Thus, the utility functions for the incumbent, J, and the chosen 
challenger, T, can be reduced to:
)()](),(|,|[)()(|| 11
*
1
* eClGoFxJElGoFxJU JJt
J
tt
JJ
t
J
t   eq (3)
)()](),(|,|[)()(|| 11
*
1
* eClGoFxTElGoFxTU TJt
J
tt
TT
t
T
t   eq (4)
where itU is the utility to committee },{, TJii  in period t, and all remaining terms are as 
before.  Recall that eq (4) is just the winner of the subgame between Q and R in eq (1) and eq (2).
The first term of this utility function is the benefit that the committee (legislator) obtains 
from the equilibrium policy that will be passed.  Committees (legislators) receive positive benefit 
the closer the policy outcome is to their ideal point.  The second term is the discounted benefit 
obtained by the committee (legislator) from oversight jurisdiction, 0(.) 

o
U it .  The third term 
is the legislative jurisdiction a committee (legislator) has.  Note that the benefits to the two 
committees are zero-sum—any gain in jurisdiction by one committee is a loss by a second 
committee (however, this is not the case for legislator that sit on the same committee).  
In the fight between committees, we assume that the incumbent committee, J, has all the 
jurisdictional power, while the challenger committee, T, has none.  This maps into policy A in 
Figure 1.  Normalizing this, we say that 0)(,1)(  lGlG TJ at the outset and create a bound for 
2all time periods such that ]1,0[)( lGi .  So if the challenger bill is referred to J, there is no 
change in utility to either committee.  However, if the challenger bill is referred to T, then J loses 
utility and T gains that same amount of utility, so that 0(.)(.) 	

 l
U
l
U Jt
T
t .
The fourth term is the discounted expected payoff to the committee (legislator) of waiting 
until the next congress to enact policy, and is a function of the policy outcome in the next period 
and both jurisdictional outcomes. Finally, there is a cost to bill introduction, and that is 
encapsulated in )(eC i , such that the incumbent committee has lower marginal cost in writing a 
bill than all potential challengers e
eC
e
eC JT


 )()( , but all challengers do not have the 
same marginal costs.  This will induce the incumbent committee to introduce bills before the 
challenger will, ceteris paribus.
We can now discuss the first hypothesis of attenuation.  There are two ways to analyze it.  
A simple and general way is to examine the utility function of the challenger.  Recognize that the 
challenger can maintain the same utility levels if she gets less jurisdiction (second and third 
term) and more policy (first term).  That is, the challenger is willing to trade jurisdiction for 
policy.
An alternative way to examine this is to apply it to the case being analyzed.  We leave the 
challenger selection process aside for now and assume the best challenger has been selected.  In 
the model, an incumbent committee member, J, proposes a bill that is referred to the incumbent 
committee (equivalent an issue in the position A in Figure 1).  The challenger committee 
member, T, can choose either to introduce a bill at cost, )(eC T , or not introduce a bill.  If there is 
no bill introduction, then the equilibrium policy outcome is the incumbent’s policy position, 
provided is closer to the median voter, M, than the status quo, F, is to M, will become policy.  
3If the challenger does introduce a bill, there is a probability, p, that this bill will be 
referred by the Parliamentarian to the challenger committee, will be pivotal in the behavior of 
committees.  If the bill is introduced to the incumbent’s committee, the equilibrium is the same 
as the case above (when there is no challenger bill).  
If the second bill is referred to the challenger committee, the challenger committee has 
obtained some amount of jurisdictional benefit because the Parliamentarian now recognizes T as 
a legitimate source of legislative jurisdiction over the issue.  Conversely, J loses some 
jurisdictional benefit, because formerly its legislative jurisdiction was unchallenged.
With two bills in two committees, there are three possible outcomes.  First, both bills 
could come to the floor and a floor fight would ensue, the costs to the majority party are very 
high (e.g. campaign finance reform), and we assume the Speaker, through his gate-keeping 
capabilities, will kill both bills.  This would be equivalent to a second outcome—the leadership 
will kill both bills and the status quo will persist until the next year, when there is a possibility to 
introduce bills again.
To consider the effects of jurisdictional outcomes on policy, let us consider extreme 
effects of the bill referral process.  Let us assume the probability of a second bill referral to the 
challenger committee, T, is p = 1.  First, recognize that that even if no policy passes, T is better 
off and J is worse off, for reasonable bill introduction costs )(eC T .  This is because by merely 
having the second bill referred to T, the challenger gains some legislative jurisdiction over the 
issue and J loses some legislative jurisdiction over the issue.  Second, on the policy-making 
front, the incumbent will introduce a bill so as to maximize its expected utility.  In order to do 
this, the incumbent must introduce bill C so that the challenger is no worse off than the 
compromise policy solution plus the expected jurisdictional gains it would make (minus the costs 
4of bill introduction) from introducing another bill.  As the probability that T receives a second 
bill increases, the incumbent is willing to introduce a bill closer to T’s ideal point.  The 
equilibrium policy when there is jurisdictional conflict will be on the interval [T,F’] where F’ is 
the same distance from F to T, but positioned on the opposite side of T than is F. This is a form 
of compromise—offering a more moderate policy position to induce no challenge from a 
potential competitor.1 This provides the intuition for Hypothesis 1.  Thus, the compensation 
required for the jurisdictional gain moves the policy closer to T; higher cost moves the 
equilibrium away from T.  The higher T values jurisdiction, the closer is equilibrium policy to F’.
We can now append the challenger selection process.  In order to achieve sub-game 
perfection in the full game, we must know what is the Nash equilibrium in the first stage.  It is 
clear that a Nash equilibrium strategy for the challenger committee is to choose a challenging 
legislator who generates the most policy compromise.  That is going to be the legislator who 
obtains the most utility from challenging.  The incumbent’s equilibrium policy offer is as close to 
T as is necessary to stop a jurisdictional challenge.  Both the incumbent and the challengers have 
no incentive to move off their strategies, given the other’s strategy.  Hence, we have a Nash
equilibrium in the first stage.  Thus, a complete characterization of Hypothesis 1 is that 
1 In a one period game (without expectations), there will always be compromise, enforced by the Speaker’s 
gatekeeping power.   However, politicians create policy today in the shadow of the future.  If there is full 
information of these expectations in the next period, compromise is still reached.   This is because both committees 
know the expectations about the outcome of the legislative game in the next period, and can factor this into the 
compromise they frame in this period.  However, if there is uncertainty, and information is private, then compromise 
may be elusive.  Assume each committee makes a private, unbiased assessment of its future prospects in the next 
congress, with some error, 
 ~ N(0, 2) (Priest and Klein 1984).  If both sides have negative errors (private 
pessimistic draws about their prospects for the next period) then there will be more room for compromise in the 
current period.  If both sides have positive errors (private optimism about their possibilities in the next period), then 
there will be no compromise and both bills will die.  If one side is optimistic and one side is pessimistic, then it is 
the relative optimism and pessimism that will matter.  With respect to the two focal bills, both bills were killed in the 
Rules Committee by the House leadership.  Both sides were optimistic about their chances in the next Congress, and 
this resulted in neither side accepting compromise.  Thus, even though either bill would likely have made the 
median voter of the House floor better off than Feist, both bills died.  A more complete account can be found in 
Author (2002).
5challenger forces the incumbent’s attenuation to a point as close to T as possible with the 
selection of the challenging legislator.
While we cannot identify precise who this legislator is theoretically, we can examine the 
comparative statics.  These comparative statics are the same as they are for the fight between the 
two committees, as outlined earlier in the appendix.  Specifically, a legislator on the competing
committee is more likely to be selected the more she gains from jurisdiction, the more she gains 
from policy outcomes, and the more she values the future.  This then leads us to Hypothesis 2.
